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Centre on International Migration, Remittances and Diaspora

CIMRAD Working Paper No. 01-18

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November 2018

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1. Introduction

United Kingdom (UK) hosts the largest Pakistani migrant population in Europe. The Pakistani diaspora constitutes the second largest ethnic minority residing in the UK, after British Indians (ONS, 2011). According to the 2011 census, there were a total of 1,174,983 people of Pakistani descent in the UK, a number that has grown from only 5000 in 1951. The proportion of Pakistani born population with British nationality was around 69 per cent of the total (ONS, 2011).

This paper first presents a historical background for the Pakistani presence in the United Kingdom and examines its evolution over time. The key question of the integration of Pakistani migrants into British society followed by a review of their ties with the home country is also addressed in this paper. This analysis is conducted with the purpose of identifying the main challenges faced by the Pakistani diaspora in the UK.

2. Tracing the Evolution of Pakistani Migrants to the UK

The rapid growth of Britain's South Asian diaspora can inextricably be seen as a manifestation of colonialism. Labour immigration was not a novel phenomenon as it had begun even before Pakistan's independence, but the post-partition migration necessitated a more open-minded stance by the governments of both countries towards it (Ballard, 2002). Initially, migrants from the subcontinent prior to its partition in 1947, to Britain went as far back as 300 years ago during the seventeenth century, due to the requirement of cheap labour by the British East India Company. The workers recruited mostly comprised of sailors with early migrants residing in port towns (Ballard, 2002). Pre-partition migration was temporary in nature with travellers returning to their home country after completing their jobs (Visram, 2002).

The migration flows from Pakistan after independence in 1947 were very different owing to its more permanent nature. From 5000 in 1951 the

numbers increased to 24,900 in 1961 after which the figure dramatically rose to 119,700 in 1966 (Chatterji and Washbrook, 2013). This marked the ending of the first phase of migration to the United Kingdom triggered by the post-war economic boom and the losses during the Second World War. Britain faced the shortage of labour mainly in labour intensive sectors such as the textile industry, with inherently poor working conditions. Most of these first generation migrants worked as factory workers saving the major part of their wages to set up their own businesses and buy properties (Werbner, 2004). Most of these businesses relied on cost effective labour, in most instances family members.

The influx of a large number of migrants from 1954 onwards, comprising not only of migrants from South Asia but also from West Indies and other post-colonial states as well as the series of racially charged riots in Notting Hill, London, encouraged the British government to consider imposing immigration controls. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 was the very first attempt by the British Government to control immigration of Commonwealth passport holders by requiring prospective immigrants to apply for work vouchers. These developments reinforced the pattern of chain migration with those already settled inviting their family and friends to the UK.

The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968 imposed restrictions on the future rights of entry of the Commonwealth citizens to those who had at least one parent or grandparent born in the UK or themselves were born in UK (Ballard, 2002). Initially, most of the first generation migrants travelled to Britain with plans of returning after some time. However as a result of immigration controls, migration then became more permanent and family oriented, the 'myth of return' now having been completely disregarded (Abbas, 2011).[1]

The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1971 placed further controls on immigrants, with the primary immigration of Pakistani nationals almost coming to a standstill, only asylum seekers and holders of special vouchers and those who wanted to enter for family reunification were allowed entry (Layton-Henry, 1992).

[1]This is because the migrants already residing in the country could not keep working on work vouchers, and thus had to apply for permanent citizenships.

A cyclical pattern characterized the next wave of migration to the UK. Pakistani migrants continued moving to Britain for marriage or on student or work visas permits, the latter of which requires individuals to be highly skilled professionals in professional fields (Samad, 2012). The overall Pakistani diaspora community rose from 747,285 in 2001 to 1,174,983 in 2011 (ONS, 2011). This data incorporates not only first generation migrants but also their second and third generation counterparts. However, it is the UK born Pakistanis who account for over half of the Pakistani population growth since 1991. The 2001 census revealed that 86 per cent of Pakistanis aged 0 to 14 were born in the UK and during 2001 to 2011, the total Pakistani born population increased from 308,000 to 482,000. (The Change Institute, 2009).

Even though a considerable percentage of the population (around 30%) arrived before 1981 and before the stricter immigration controls, the highest percentage of arrivals (around 40%) was recorded during 2001 to 2011. It is surprising considering the rise in immigration controls, which should ideally have decreased the percentage of arrivals. According to the census, this can partly be due to including resident students in the census data (ONS, 2013). Pakistan is among the top ten non-EU student sending countries, with the figure for Pakistani students standing at 7,185 and 6,665 in 2012-13 and 2013-14, respectively (UKCISA, 2015). However, the number of the student population is not large enough to account for the significant increase in the percentage of arrivals.

Family migration among the Pakistani community may also partly explain the rise in immigration. According to research by the Home Office, out of the migrants who arrived in 2004, Pakistanis formed the second largest group after Indians that had acquired settlement by 2009 where 60% of them had arrived via a family-related migration route. This provides a stark contrast to the corresponding figure of 23% for Indians (ONS, 2011). Family route migration, to some extent, also accounts for the dramatic increase in the number of Pakistani immigrants immediately prior to the immigration acts. A larger number of Pakistanis may have felt the need to migrate owing to the precarious security situation in the country. The figure below gives an estimate of the number of Pakistanis being granted spousal settlement in 2009, according to which Pakistan ranks second. This partly explains the significant rise in the diaspora from 2001 to 2011.

Table 1: Top 20 nationalities granted spousal (husbands and wives) settlement in 2009

1. India	13985
2. Pakistan	13035
3.Bangladesh	4410
4. Philippines	3070
5. China	3025
6. Nigeria	2710
7. South Africa	2690
8. USA	2360
9. Turkey	2115
10. Thailand	1840

Source: Charlsley et.al, 2009

3. Integration of Pakistani diaspora in UK- cultural conservatism or social cohesion?

Migration to Britain from non-EU countries, increasing substantially over the past few decades, brings forth numerous debates on multiculturalism. As a highly diverse cohort of migrants resides in the United Kingdom, the country has adopted a race relation policy to promote multiculturalism, equality, and tolerance (Favell, 2001). However starting with the advent of riots in 2001, and the 2005 bombings, the government has been changing its stance related to multiculturalism, hoping to improve social cohesion by making the communities less segregated. This section examines the integration of British Pakistanis in terms of their economic and social characteristics in British society, analysing how the diaspora is faring in a multicultural environment.

3.1. Economic Integration: Affluence and Labour Market Conditions

Pakistanis form the second largest group after Bangladeshis with the highest levels of income poverty of 55% (ONS, 2014). The 2011 census indicated that 49 per cent of the British Pakistanis were in employment, 9 per cent were unemployed and 42 per cent were categorized as economically inactive. This, in contrast, is lower than the relatively better figures for India. Additionally, differences in the standard of living amongst the Pakistani community itself persist. The possible reasons behind this are varied and explanations lie to some extent in the past. The migrants from the rural Mirpur valley in Azad Kashmir, who often

took jobs in the textile sector in the north of England or West Midlands, were adversely affected by its decline. Also, these migrants undertook low paying jobs, precipitating entire families to migrate and join them in these labour intensive sectors. On closer inspection, three striking factors affecting economic aspects of the current diaspora emerge; their geographical distribution, their occupational characteristics and the role of women in the workforce.

The economic characteristics and disparities among the British Pakistanis may be reinforced due to a north-south divide. Those residing in London and south-eastern parts of the UK maintain higher educational attainment levels and are relatively more socially mobile whereas the Pakistani population in the west of Midlands and north of England have suffered from a switch to service industry and a decline in the manufacturing sector (Samad, 2012).

Samad (2012) found that most of the middle-class professional Pakistanis including health professionals, scientists, IT and financial sector workers and businessmen are concentrated in London. Pakistani communities, particularly Kashmiris concentrated in Birmingham, Bradford, and Oldham and nearby northern towns, were found to be economically less affluent than the other Pakistani ethnic minorities. Economic wellbeing hence may be dependent on where the diaspora is settled. For instance, in The Humber, West Midlands, and Yorkshire, less than half of the Bangladeshis and Pakistanis were in employment. Overall, in terms of employability for the Pakistani diaspora, statistics present a grim picture.

The economic success of Diasporas is inevitably also shaped by occupational characteristics. For example, of those who were employed, 57% of the men from Pakistani origin were engaged in low skilled jobs. They formed the highest proportion in this category followed by Black Africans (54%) and Bangladeshi men (53%). The figure was slightly higher for women i.e. around 61% (ONS, 2014).

The table below lists the occupations with the highest proportion of ethnic groups as revealed in the 2011 census. It shows Pakistani's significant presence in the wholesale and retail trade as well as auto repair. None of these occupations come under the high-income bracket, and may significantly reinforce the class characteristics of the Pakistani diaspora.

Table 2: Top 5 Industries for men with highest proportion of ethnic group

Ethnicity	Industry	Proportion (%)
Bangladeshi	Accommodation and food service activities	36
Chinese	Accommodation and food service activities	31
Pakistani	Wholesale and retail trade: repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles	22
Indian	Wholesale and retail trade: repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles	21

Source: England and Wales census, 2011 Office of National Statistics

It is noteworthy that a considerable percentage of British Pakistani men, particularly are engaged in self-employment. A number of British Pakistanis have been successful in setting up retail and wholesale businesses, reaping benefits off cheap labour. For instance, Joe Bloggs, which was a multimillion-pound company, had Pakistani origins (Ember, Ember and Skoggard, 2005). British Pakistanis have established a foothold in the housing rental market, beginning with renting out to Pakistani immigrants with settlers now primarily consisting of Asian students (Werbner, 2004). An example of a property dealing company created by a British Pakistani is the MCR property group that operates in Liverpool and Manchester (Ember, Ember and Skoggard, 2005).

In Bradford, Glasgow, and Manchester almost all of the restaurateurs are Pakistanis. The highly renowned *'Balti'* dish that is perceived to have its roots in Kashmir, having been created in 1977 by an immigrant of Kashmiri origin, is considered a trademark Pakistani dish, with it receiving a protected geographical status by the Birmingham City Council in 2009 (Britten, 2009). Yet another sector where the presence of British Pakistanis has remained notable is the transport or the taxi-driving business. This has been a particularly lucrative sector for those without any formal qualifications (The Change Institute, 2009).

The labour market census of 2011 also revealed that the labour force participation of Pakistani women was among the group with very high levels of economic inactivity i.e. 60%; they also formed the second highest group among those who worked less than 15 hours per week. Over half of the Pakistani women were also more likely to work part-time (ONS, 2014). Low educational qualifications and less fluency in the English language makes their economic integration difficult.

Labour market performance has distinct welfare implications for different South Asian ethnic groups. The income figures for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are relatively lower compared to the Indians. However, official statistics do not take into account Pakistanis or more broadly the involvement of South Asians in the informal economy. Low participation rates of the Pakistani women, large family sizes and generally lower wage rates for British ethnic minorities can be perceived as important factors accounting for high levels of poverty (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2007). Lack of appropriate education and training may partly serve as an explanation as well as the solution to the problem.

In general, the Kashmiris who comprise over half of the Pakistani settler population in the UK are economically less well off. Excluding this group, the entry of non-Kashmiri Pakistanis into public service professional occupations and businesses is similar to the Indians (Werbner, 2004). Werbner (2005) also argues that the South Asian community can't be divided in terms of nationality or origin. Instead, the migration history, class background and sub continental regional origins need to be considered.

Even though Pakistanis are characterized by lower socio-economic characteristics, there have been indicators of improving educational and labour market outcomes. The differences between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are often masked since they are normally grouped together for purposes of analyses. For instance, Bangladeshis have around 5% higher unemployment rate compared to Pakistanis. In the recent past, the number of Pakistanis entering higher education and professional occupations has gone up. 60 per cent of the Pakistani workers with a work permit in 2005 were involved in professional or technical occupations such as IT engineers, doctors, sales representatives and managers (The Change Institute, 2009).

3.2. Social Integration: Political Representation and Cultural Assimilation

In terms of many aspects of social integration, British Pakistanis seem to be lagging behind. Although some improvements have been made, strong ties and loyalty towards their native land and its traditions and customs, have hampered effective integration of Pakistani migrants in the British society. The government's stance on multiculturalism may be blamed here, as it has led to greater segregation instead of integration, with

communities being deeply connected with their roots. One important facilitator for this has been the practice of kinship marriages.

Internationally arranged marriages have been a focal point behind the formation of ghettoes in Britain. South Asian communities, in particular, arrange marriages back home to strengthen *biradiri* relationships and engender their ethnic identities. British Pakistanis display a high rate of close kin or consanguineous marriages conforming to cultural practices. Arranging these marriages highlights commitment to migrant's kin, enabling British Pakistanis to strengthen their communities (Shaw, 2001). Conserving cultural and religious values in children and protecting from the influence of the western culture serve as potential motivating factors as well.

Over time, Pakistani citizens in the UK have to some extent managed a say in the workings of the British society. An important facilitator for this has been political representation. Political affiliation of British Pakistanis is mostly aligned with the labour party. Their engagement with British politics has increased considerably since the 1970s, in reaction to concerns over allegations of discrimination and racism levied by British Pakistanis on the government (Peace, 2015). The Pakistani diaspora now has developed affiliations with all major political parties in the UK, with Pakistani women in recent times have a greater interest and participation in the political and public realms (Akhtar, 2013).

Political representation of British Pakistanis has significantly risen with the 2015 elections in the UK resulting in the election of 10 citizens of Pakistani heritage in the House of Commons. (Dawn.com, 2015). Noteworthy Britons of Pakistani heritage in the House of Lords include former minister for faith and communities, Sayeeda Warsi of the conservative party (Mortimer, 2015), and Lord Tariq Ahmed of Wimbledon (The Express Tribune, 2010). Sayeeda Warsi, in particular, has been quite vocal about issues of discrimination and the rights of Muslims and Pakistanis in the country. Many politicians in Pakistan hold dual nationalities such as Ishrat-ul-Ibad Khan and Rehman Malik who are active in the political arena of Pakistan. The diaspora community also takes an active interest in the political sphere of Pakistan. The Kashmiri community, for instance, has been a strong advocate of the settlement of the Kashmir issue, signifying a culture of diaspora politics (Lyon and Bolognani, 2011).

It is important to note that some minority candidates over time have managed to win seats in areas without significant ethnic minority populations. However, widespread support does come through *biradiri* politicking and kinship networks with many politicians till date depending on mobilizing support from their own community networks (Peace, 2015). Many believe that although such *biradiri* politicking has been an important contributor towards greater political say for the British Pakistanis, this practice now requires reform, with second and third generation Pakistanis moving away from it (Akhtar, 2013). However, kinship politics is seen as the only way of gaining legitimacy by many Pakistanis as racism and discrimination has historically kept British Muslims out of politics. Such practices further consolidate kinship networks and may restrict effective integration in the society, as they foster notions of separate identity.

Pakistani culture is also being promoted by way of media by the diaspora. The lives of British Pakistanis have often been portrayed in films such as BAFTA nominated '*My Beautiful Laundrette*', '*The Infidel* and '*Four Lions'*, which focused on extremism and issues of religion (News.bbc.co.uk, 2015). A British sitcom *'Citizen Khan'* especially focuses on a British Pakistani family (Lawson, 2015). Radio channels headed by British Pakistanis are also available such as *Apni Awaz* and *Radio XL* of Birmingham and *Asian Sound* in Manchester. The Pakistani diaspora is also quite active in the print media, with journalists such as Anila Baig, Asad Ahmad and Aasmah Mir for the Guardian, the Sun and other big newspapers (Chatterji and Washbrook, 2013). These mediums are invariably helping to engender a more positive and realistic image of Pakistan.

4. Does the diaspora remain connected with Pakistan?

An examination of the links that the diaspora community maintains with their home country reveals that although the diaspora community had always remained connected with their roots, the frequency and intensity of these transnational relations have magnified over time, allowing the migrants to play a more significant role in strengthening connections between the host and home country.

4.1. Economic Linkages: Remittances and Trade Flows

After the end of foreign exchange controls by the UK in 1979, there is no official mechanism to record remittances that cross international borders including their volume, destination, and usage. A considerably large amount of flows are sent via unofficial channels e.g. through friends and family visiting the UK, leading to further underestimation in the figures. Another factor that makes it hard to record remittances is that estimates are based on non-standardised data from recipient countries.

In the fiscal year 2012-13, the UK, in particular, accounted for 14% (GBP 1,228 million) of total final remittance flows to Pakistan. The table below reveals that there has been a persistent increase in remittances from the UK over time (The Migration Observatory, 2013). It is interesting to note how the total remittances from the UK to Pakistan have increased from 11 percent in 2011 to 14 percent in 2013, whereas for Bangladesh they have experienced a slight decline.

Table 3: Annual remittances to Bangladesh and Pakistan (nominal, GBP million)

Fiscal Year	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
UK to Bangladesh (£)	575	616	626
Total Bangladesh (£)	7536	8012	9123
Share from UK (%)	8	8	7
UK to Pakistan (£)	776	949	1228
Total Pakistan (£)	7245	8226	8783
Share from UK (%)	11	12	14

Source: The Migration Observatory

There is, however, a lack of information pertaining to the characteristics of the migrants who are sending remittances such as their income levels (The Observation Migratory, 2013). This is an important issue which needs to be addressed in order to ensure that appropriate evidence based policies can be formulated. According to some studies, there are differences in the amount of remittances sent depending on the ethnicity (The Observation Migratory, 2013). Based on the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, Clark and Drinkwater (2007), concluded that those of the Caribbean and Pakistani origin are more likely to remit

(37% of Caribbeans and 30% of Pakistanis) compared to the Chinese (27%), Bangladeshis (21%) and Indians (14%).

The trade surplus that exists between Pakistan and the UK provides an indication of the potential of the bilateral trade relations to contribute to foreign exchange reserves. In 2013, the UK-Pakistan trade in goods and services stood at 2.2 billion pounds (House of Commons, 2015). The UK Investment and Trade roadmap, which aimed to increase trade between both countries to 3 billion pounds to 2015, clearly highlights the positive impact that diaspora engagement can have on enhancing the perception of Pakistan as a place of doing business.

In addition to remittances, the diaspora also contributes to the economic development of their home country by spending on Pakistani goods available in the UK market. They help facilitate trade by creating demand for Pakistani goods and services. In the UK particularly, there is a considerable demand for Pakistani export good ranging from fruits (mangoes and citrus) and spices (Shan masala) to furniture and local clothing brands (Junaid Jamshed and Bareeze) (Amjad and Burki, 2013). The diaspora helps local companies gain international recognition by acting as a bridge between the consumers and producers in the country of origin and destination.

4.2. Does Mirpur Represent a Success Story of Migration?

Taking into consideration the massive flow of migrants from the district of Mirpur to the United Kingdom, it would be useful to analyse the different ways in which Mirpuri's have contributed to the local economy. This would also allow some important policy lessons to be drawn.

The historical context of the emigration from this district of Azad Kashmir has already been presented in the first section. In lieu of the fact that they originated from a relatively economically backward district, the population of Mirpur has made remarkable progress and thus it is often said that the Mirpuris have 'hit the jackpot' (Ballard, 2003).

Mirpur has been a recipient of a massive flow of financial capital. During the 1970s, for instance, Mirpur had the highest number of banks in the entire sub-continent (Ballard, 2003). The region's economy is often characterized by short term housing booms, the earliest of which was experienced in the 1970s when the first generation migrants had

abundant savings and had not yet reunited with their families in UK. The inflow of remittances consequently resulted in a considerable boom in the housing construction sector. There was a rapid demand for building material as well as labour. However, with the onset of the recession in the 1980s, the situation reversed leading to a sharp decline in the demand for construction material and properties. During this decade, there was a significant decline in the flow of remittances, leading to a closing down of some of the rural branches of banks that had been formed during the earlier boom period (Ballard, 2003).

Since the 1990s, these migrants resorted to different kinds of niche activities for income generation including self-employment such as taxi driving and take-away (Kalra, 2000). Secondly, during the 1990s, the fall in the value of rupee as well as the retirement of first generation migrants encouraged them to act upon their desire of building lavish residences in their hometown. This primarily accounts for the second and more spectacular housing boom in the district. In the urban areas, in addition to the construction of small shops, more recently, a substantial investment has been directed towards the building of huge shopping arcades, referred to as 'Plazas' (Ballard, 2003).

Therefore, the economy of Mirpur can still be described as 'capital-rich'. Ballard (2003) argues that even though, Mirpuris have established their presence well in Britain, their success has not translated into effective and sustainable development solutions for their local economy. In this regard, there are several important factors that need to be taken into account. Firstly, it is important to note how the major proportion of capital flows have been invested in real estate leading to a substantial increase in the value of land. It has also become evident that the prosperity of the region is very much dependant on the flow of remittances, which, as demonstrated above, has been far from stable.

According to Ballard (2003), the local population hasn't made effective use of the money from remittances. Rather than investing it wisely in order to build a better future for themselves in Mirpur, they spent the money to afford a more leisurely lifestyle. In the meanwhile, they preferred to wait for an invitation by their relatives to join them when in the UK. Hence, the inflow of remittances failed to enhance the productive base of the local economy. Agriculture, as well as industrial development, has been largely overlooked in the district.

Therefore, the case of Mirpur helps draw two important conclusions; firstly, the stability of remittance flows as well as it's effective use needs to be taken into account when analysing the impact on the local economy.

4.3. Socio-Political Linkages: Diaspora Philanthropy and Political Participation

The Pakistani diaspora's involvement in philanthropic and charitable activities includes raising funds for the education and health sector and for citizens affected by natural disasters in Pakistan. However, the diaspora community is generally distrustful of the Pakistani Government and public officials owing to increased incidences of bribery and corruption, which they encounter while visiting Pakistan. Consequently, they prefer to contribute towards, or finance, small-scale projects that can be managed on their own or by their relatives living in Pakistan (House of Commons, 2013).

Formal visits by politicians of both countries serve as a two-way engagement process and help involve the Pakistanis in social and political structures of Pakistan. Some politicians have also returned to Pakistan and acquired prominent positions within the government and the politics. This includes the former MP of Glasgow Mohammad Sarwar who served as the Governor of Punjab from 2013 to 2015. Political parties in Pakistan are motivated to set up their political structures and affiliations in the UK. This provides a local platform for socio-political and religious links for people.

5. Challenges Faced by the Diaspora

5.1. The Issue of Identity

The Pakistani Diaspora has been a well-researched community in the British context. In particular, the Pakistani diaspora has received a considerable amount of attention from the media with regards to its integration into the British society. A number of studies have examined the cause of integration in the British-Pakistani community, with terms like "myth of return" and "ghettoization", being constantly employed for the community (PILDAT, 2008).

Citizenship identities of British Pakistanis have varied with different generations, with first generation Pakistanis still displaying a deep

connection to their home country, second generation Pakistanis also exhibiting a strong connection with Pakistan, while third generations primarily identifying themselves as British (Ember, Ember and Skoggard, 2005). All three generations, however primarily describe themselves as British Muslims signifying a greater association with religion as compared to culture.

In the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7, the issue of identity has become more critical with the increase in Islamophobia being seen as engendering discontentment amongst British-Pakistanis. The first generation Pakistanis consider themselves denizens, living but not belonging in Britain while second generation British Pakistanis limiting their protests to a need for tolerance. (Hussain, 2005).

Beginning in the 1980's, South Asians, including many British Pakistanis started becoming more vocal about racism, particularly after antiracist policies and theories of the 1980's failed to account for the South Asian experience. South Asians thus began to reject the use of the term 'Black' to represent them (Modood, 1994). They popularized the term 'cultural-racism' as opposed to colour-racism in connection to them (Hoffman, 1996). Ethnic issues increased manifold after incidences such as the Honeyford Affair in Bradford, where after insulting Pakistani culture, the head teacher was reprimanded by the students (see Halstead 1994; Akhtar 2013). Such incidents engendered a feeling of unity amongst the South Asian community.

Discrimination towards British Pakistanis in the labour market is reflected in their lower chances of selection and promotion (Carmichael and Woods, 2000), and in educational institutions by dropping out of school early (Modood et al., 1997). On the other hand, evidence points towards British Pakistanis also producing higher numbers of university entrants and applicants (Modood, 1998). Theories on deprivation and discrimination faced by the Pakistani diaspora may not be giving full justice to both sides of the argument.

5.2. Pakistani women in the diaspora: advantaged or disadvantaged?

Primary migration to the United Kingdom has essentially been male dominated. Women, in most cases, have migrated as part of family reunification schemes. Migration for Pakistani women proved to be difficult in the beginning as much of the traditional knowledge they had

acquired was not recognized in the face of British scientific knowledge and culture creating feelings of alienation (Afshar et al. 2005). Their identity as British-Pakistani women separated them from white women with similar education levels in the labour market hence their job prospects were seen as being considerably lower due to their origins (Evans, 2000).

However, second-generation Pakistani women are demonstrating a growing presence in the public realm (Brown, 2007). A significant factor influencing greater participation has been the debate around Islam. For instance, Pakistani Muslims living in Manchester, particularly women became more politically active following the Rushdie affair (Werbner, 2004).[2]

5.3. Religion and the Diaspora: Marginalization and Discrimination

Pakistani diaspora in the United Kingdom has increasingly been linked with notions of extremism; resulting from factors such as economic marginalization combined with perceived injustices and discriminations against Muslims around the world. The Muslim victimization or discrimination theories were fuelled by events such as Rushdie affair, a war on Iraq as well as the continuing Israel-Palestine confrontation (Hoodhboy, 2005).

An important factor influencing the victimization theory is the role of media in creating a bias against Muslims. For instance, the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights identified a bias created by the media against Muslim terror suspects, mostly of Pakistani origin, even when they were released without charges (IHF 2005). BBC found that in the UK, the media portrayed the Muslim terror suspects (usually of a Pakistani origin) with bias often implying convictions when most of the suspects get released without any charge (BBC, 2015).

The overriding consequence of ethnic and religious marginalization can be witnessed in the case of career opportunities. Essentially, getting a job in Britain that meets ones educational and professional qualifications is observed as being easier for some groups of people than others, signifying ethnic and religious biases (Johnston, Sirkeci, Khattab and

[2] Refers to the publication of the *Satanic Verses* by the British Indian author Salman Rushdie that critiques Islamic fundamentalism and was regarded as highly offensive by Muslims all over the world.

Modood, 2010; Cheung and Heath, 2007). These biases have been especially prevalent in the case of Muslims (Werbner, 1997), an issue that has worsened since 9/11 (Allen, 2005). Islamophobia together with cultural racism had a considerable impact on job prospects of Muslims, particularly Pakistani Muslims in Britain (Rana, 2007).

6. Conclusion

British Pakistanis are increasingly adopting Islamic rituals and practices that differentiate them from other South Asians and Non-Muslim youngsters. This promotes the accusation of self-segregation that is levied on the Muslim diaspora, leading to difficulties in peaceful integration (Werbner, 2004). At the same time studies show that British Muslims appear to have a higher trust in the government, and higher satisfaction levels as compared to Christians (Maxwell, 2010).

In order to continue strengthening linkages between both the countries, reform is essential in certain areas. For example, as far the home country is concerned, accurate recording and documentation of remittances is of utmost importance if sound evidence-based policies are to be formulated. Additionally, greater collaboration with diasporic organisations in the UK should be encouraged. It is imperative to promote further integration of the Pakistani diaspora in the British society while dealing with issues such as low participation rates for women. The diaspora can also play an active role in engendering a positive and secular image of Islam, in order to counter the spread of Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims. Therefore, strengthening linkages between UK and Pakistan requires the combined efforts of the governments, the Pakistani diaspora and the citizens of UK.

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The Centre on International Migration, Remittances and Diaspora (CIMRAD) was established in 2014 by the Lahore School of Economics and is the first institute of its kind in Pakistan. The Centre specializes in the study and analysis of international migration and its social and economic consequences – with a focus on the diaspora and the flow of remittances.

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